Our global problems and what we need to do about them by Maxwell, N
1  
CHAPTER SEVEN  
Death and Anti-Death, vol. 10:  
Ten Years After John Rawls, ch. 7, pp. 131-174. 
 
Our Global Problems And What 
We Need To Do About Them 
 
Nicholas Maxwell
1
 
 
In this essay I argue that, in order to solve our grave global 
problems we need to bring about a revolution in our universities.  
First, however, I set out to depict the religious dimension to our 
problems.  We need to revise our ideas about the nature of God. 
 
Cutting God in Half – And Putting the Pieces Together Again 
Traditionally, God is a Being who created the universe and 
everything in it, a Being who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-
loving, the source of all value, a Being who cares, profoundly, for the 
salvation of our souls.  This is, I take it, a traditional central tenet of 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam. 
 
But there is a problem.  An all-powerful, all-knowing Being, if 
He exists, would be responsible for all suffering and death caused by 
natural phenomena.  Such a Being would even be co-responsible for 
suffering and death caused by people, in that it would be God’s 
decision not to render the poison or the bullet harmless at the last 
second.  Far from being all-loving, such a Being would be a monster 
infinitely more evil than a mere human Hitler or Stalin. 
 
The traditional God cannot exist.  It is refuted by the most 
elementary facts of human experience.
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At once the question arises: How can this traditional conception 
of God be improved so that (a) as much as possible of what is of 
value in the traditional notion is preserved, (b) the above objection to 
the existence of God is overcome, and (c) there is a good chance that 
God, in this new sense, does exist? 
 
My proposal is that we need to cut God in half.  We need to sever 
what may be called the “God-of-Cosmic-Power” from the “God-of-
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Cosmic-Value”.  It is fusing these together to form the one Being of 
the traditional God that creates the insuperable problem of an all-
loving God who is also utterly evil. 
 
The God-of-Cosmic-Power is Einstein’s God.  It is the under-
lying unified pattern of physical law in the physical universe, 
inherent in all phenomena, that is – together with initial conditions – 
responsible for everything that goes on.  The God-of-Cosmic-Power 
has some of the attributes of the traditional God.  It is all-powerful, 
eternal, and omnipresent.  But It is an It – and can therefore be 
forgiven all the terrible things It does.  It cannot know what It does. 
 
The God-of-Cosmic-Value is what is of most value associated 
with our human world – or the world of sentient life, more generally.  
It is what is best in us.  It is that potentially or actually aware and 
loving self within us that sees, feels, knows and understands, at least 
partially, and either does intervene to prevent disaster, or is 
powerless to do so.  The God-of-Cosmic-Value is the soul of 
humanity, embedded in the physical universe, striving to protect, to 
care for, to love, but all too often, alas, powerless to prevent human 
suffering. 
 
We have good reasons, I maintain, to hold that both the God-of-
Cosmic-Power and the God-of-Cosmic-Value do indeed exist.  
Elsewhere I have argued that once we get the nature of science 
properly into perspective it becomes clear that science has already 
established that the God-of Cosmic-Power exists – insofar as science 
can establish anything theoretical at all.
3
  And as for the God-of-
Cosmic-Value, we may claim we know It exists insofar as we 
experience that which is of value and have, within us, the capacity at 
least to live life lovingly. 
 
Cutting God in half in the way I have proposed, in order to arrive 
at a viable notion, creates, however, a profound new problem: How 
are the two halves to be put together again?  How is it possible for 
the God-of-Cosmic-Value to exist embedded in the God-of-Cosmic- 
Power – the physically comprehensible universe?  How can we 
understand our human world, embedded as it is within the physical 
universe, in such a way that justice is done to both the richness, 
meaning and value of human life on the one hand, and what modern 
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science tells us about the physical universe on the other hand?  How 
can what is of value associated with our human world exist and best 
flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? 
 
This problem (created by cutting God in half) is, quite simply, 
the most general and fundamental problem confronting humanity.  It 
is a philosophical problem – indeed, the fundamental problem of 
philosophy: How is it possible for our human world, imbued with 
sensory qualities, consciousness, free will, art, science, and much 
else of value, to exist embedded in the physical universe? (This 
embraces, as subordinate issues, the mind-body problem, the 
problem of free will, problems of knowledge, of perception, of the 
philosophy of science, of biology and evolution, even problems of 
moral and political philosophy, problems of language, culture, 
history, abstract entities, time, space and causation.)  The above is 
also a fundamental problem of knowledge and understanding much 
more generally – the basic problem of science: What is the nature of 
the physical universe?  How precisely do features of our human 
world, such as perceptual qualities, consciousness, and life more 
generally, fit into the physical universe?  The problem can also be 
regarded as a fundamental problem of living, of action: How can we 
help what is of value in existence, actually and potentially, to 
flourish?  What do we need to do, as individuals, so that what is of 
value to us may flourish?  And what do we need to do, collectively, 
socially and politically, so that what is of value to people 
everywhere, to humanity, may flourish?  The problem of fitting the 
God-of-Value into the God-of-Cosmic-Power (the underlying unified 
It of the physical universe) is not only a conceptual problem, a 
problem of knowledge and understanding; it is also a practical 
problem, the most general, fundamental practical problem that there 
is: to help the God-of-Value, what is of most value in us, to exist in 
the physical universe in ways that are less painful and constrained, 
more exuberant and joyful, more just, peaceful and noble, than at 
present.  Once we recognize that the God-of-Value is what is of most 
value, actually and potentially, in us, it becomes our most profound 
religious obligation to help what is of value in us to flourish in the 
real world. 
 
Elsewhere, I have discussed the philosophical and theoretical 
aspects of this problem in some detail.
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  My concern in what follows 
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is to discuss the most urgent practical aspects of the problem that 
confront us all – the most urgent global problems confronting 
humanity. 
 
Global Problems 
Can humanity help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish, 
ensnarled as it is within the remorseless grip of the Cosmic-God-
of-Power?  Can we, in other words, successfully realize what is 
genuinely of value to us in the real world – more successfully, at 
least, than we have managed to do so far, up to the first decade of 
the 21
st
 century?  Much depends, I will argue, on whether we 
succeed in putting wisdom-inquiry and aim-oriented rationality 
into practice in academia, and in life. 
 
As I have already stressed, we are confronted by grave global 
problems.  There is the problem of vast differences in wealth 
around the globe, something like a third of the world's population 
living in conditions of dire poverty, without enough to eat, safe 
water, proper shelter, health care, education, employment.  Over 9 
million children die every year from preventable causes – some 
25,000 every day.
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  There is the problem of war, over 100 million 
people having died in wars during the 20
th
 century, which 
compares unfavourably with the 12 million or so who died in wars 
in the 19
th
 century.  And we have not been doing very well in the 
first decade of the 21
st
 century. There is the problem of the spread 
and stockpiling of deadly modern armaments, even in poor 
countries, and the ever-present threat of their use by terrorists or in 
war, whether the arms be conventional, chemical, biological or 
nuclear.  Nuclear proliferation is an especially grave problem, 
India, Pakistan and north Korea having recently acquired the 
bomb, and other nations, such as Iran, likely to acquire the bomb 
soon.  There is the long-standing problem of the rapid growth of 
the world's population, especially pronounced in the poorest parts 
of the world, adversely affecting efforts at development.  There is 
the problem of the progressive destruction of tropical rain forests 
and other natural habitats, with its concomitant devastating 
extinction of species.  And there is the horror of the AIDS 
epidemic, again far more terrible in the poorest parts of the world, 
devastating millions of lives, destroying families, and crippling 
economies. 
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And, in addition to these stark global crises, there are problems 
of a more diffuse, intangible character, signs of a general cultural 
or spiritual malaise.  There is the phenomenon of political apathy: 
the problems of humanity seem so immense, so remorseless, so 
utterly beyond human control, and each one of us, a mere 
individual, seems wholly impotent before the juggernaut of 
history.  The new global economy can seem like a monster out of 
control, with human beings having to adapt their lives to its 
demands, rather than gaining support from it. There is the 
phenomenon of the trivialization of culture, as a result, perhaps, of 
technological innovation such as TV and the internet.  Once, 
people created and participated in their own live music, theatre, 
art, poetry.  Now this is pumped into our homes and into our ears 
by our technology, a mass-produced culture for mass 
consumption; we have become passive consumers, and the product 
becomes ever more trivial in content.  And finally, there is the 
phenomenon of the rise of religious and political fanaticism and 
terrorism opposed, it can seem, either in a faint-hearted and self-
doubting way, or brutally by war and the suspension of justice,  
apparently confirming Yeats's lines “The best lack all conviction, 
while the worst are full of passionate intensity”. 
 
Most serious of all, there is the impending crisis of global 
warming.  There is the real possibility that average global 
temperature will rise by 3 to 6 or even 10 degrees centigrade by 
the end of the century, rendering vast tracts of the earth's surface, 
at present densely populated, uninhabitable, sea levels rising by a 
meter or so, flooding many great cities of the world.  Reports from 
experts about the pace of global warming – shrinking of ice at the 
poles, contraction of glaciers – grow steadily more alarming year 
by year. 
 
We have known about global warming for a long time.  John 
Tyndall discovered that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas as long 
ago as 1859, and Svante Arrhenius realized in 1896 that we would 
cause global warming. Living in Sweden, he thought it would be a 
good thing. But the first person really to discover that we are 
causing global warming was Guy Callendar, who gave a lecture to 
the Meteorological Society in London on the subject in 1938. He 
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was not believed. Of course, 1938 was not the best time to make 
the announcement! Any lingering doubts should have been 
removed, however when, in the early 1960s, Charles Keeling made 
extremely accurate measurements of the increase in carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere.
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What is so shocking is that it has taken so long - several 
decades - for humanity to begin to take the impending threat 
seriously; let alone work out what needs to be done; let alone do 
it. 
 
Global warming threatens to intensify all our other global 
problems - apart, perhaps, from that of rapid population growth 
(which might be curtailed by starvation, floods, drought, and war, 
all provoked by global warming). 
 
If we are to realize what is genuinely of value to us in life more 
successfully than we have in the past we must, at the very least, 
discover how to resolve these immense global problems in very 
much more humane, intelligent, and effective ways than we have 
managed to do so far. 
 
The Role of Modern Science and Technology 
Modern science and technology have made immense 
contributions to the enrichment of human life.  The modern world 
is inconceivable without them.  But they have also made possible 
all our current global problems.  Modern science and technology 
make possible modern medicine and hygiene, modern agriculture 
and industry which, in turn, have led to population growth, 
destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species.  
Modern science, technology and industry being developed in some 
countries, but not in others, have led to immense differences in 
wealth around the world.  Science and technology have made 
modern armaments possible, and the lethal character of modern 
warfare.  As a result, the more scientifically advanced countries 
have been able to impose their will on those without modern 
science.  Even AIDS is spread by modern methods of travel, made 
possible by modern technology.  And of course global warming is 
a product of modern industry and agriculture, made possible by 
modern science and technology. 
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It is not just that modern science has made these things 
possible.  In a perfectly respectable sense of “cause”, all our global 
problems have been caused by modern science and technology.  
 
It may be objected that it is not science that is the cause of 
these global problems but rather the things that we do, made 
possible by science and technology.  This is obviously correct. But 
it is also correct to say that scientific and technological progress is 
the cause. The meaning of "cause" is ambiguous.  By "the cause" 
of event E we may mean something like "the most obvious 
observable events preceding E that figure in the common sense 
explanation for the occurrence of E".  In this sense, human actions 
(made possible by science) are the cause of such things as people 
being killed in war, destruction of tropical rain forests.  On the 
other hand, by the "cause" of E we may mean "that prior change in 
the environment of E which led to the occurrence of E, and 
without which E would not have occurred".  If we put the 20
th
 
century into the context of human history, then it is entirely correct 
to say that, in this sense, scientific-and-technological progress is 
the cause of our distinctive current global disasters: what has 
changed, what is new, is scientific knowledge and technological 
know-how, not human nature.  Give a group of chimpanzees rifles 
and teach them how to use them and in one sense, of course, the 
cause of the subsequent demise of the group would be the actions 
of the chimpanzees.  But in another obvious sense, the cause 
would be the sudden availability and use of rifles – the new, lethal 
technology.  Yet again, from the standpoint of theoretical physics, 
"the cause" of E might be interpreted to mean something like "the 
physical state of affairs prior to E, throughout a sufficiently large 
spatial region surrounding the place where E occurs".  In this third 
sense, the sun continuing to shine is as much a part of the cause of 
war and pollution as human action or human science and 
technology. 
 
In short, if by the cause of an event we mean that prior change 
which led to that event occurring (the second of the above three 
senses), then it is the advent of modern science and technology 
that has caused all our current global crises.  It is not that people 
became greedier or more wicked in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries; nor 
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is it that the new economic system of capitalism is responsible, as 
some historians and economists would have us believe.
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  The 
crucial factor is the creation and immense success of modern 
science and technology.  This has led to modern medicine and 
hygiene, to population growth, to modern agriculture and industry, 
to habitat loss and rapid extinction of species, to pollution of land, 
sea and air, to world wide travel (which spreads diseases such as 
AIDS), to global warming, and to the destructive might of the 
technology of modern war and terrorism, conventional, chemical, 
biological and nuclear. 
 
It is tempting to blame modern science and technology for our 
troubles.  But that misses the point.  We need modern science and 
technology, to help us know what our problems are, and to help us 
solve them.  We would not know we were causing global warming 
without modern science (even if there would be no global warming 
if there were no science).  The fault lies, not with science per se, 
but rather with scientific and technological research dissociated 
from the more fundamental quest to discover how to help humanity 
solve its global problems and make progress towards as good a 
world as possible.  
 
For centuries, universities have sought, first acquired 
knowledge and then, secondarily, to apply it to help solve social 
problems.  In other words, they have put what may be called 
knowledge-inquiry into academic practice.  But knowledge-
inquiry, judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human 
welfare, is grossly and damagingly irrational.  It is our long-
standing implementation of knowledge-inquiry that is, in part, 
responsible for the creation of our global problems, and our 
current incapacity to resolve them.  We need urgently to bring 
about an intellectual/institutional revolution in our universities so 
that they come to put what may be called wisdom-inquiry into 
practice – both more rigorous and of greater potential human 
value.  Wisdom-inquiry would put problems of living at the heart 
of the academic enterprise, the tackling of problems of knowledge 
emerging out of and feeding back into sustained imaginative and 
critical thinking about what our problems of living are, and what 
we ought to do about them.  Social inquiry and the humanities 
would seek to help humanity build cooperatively rational methods 
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of problem-solving into the fabric of social and political life, so 
that we may gradually acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts 
and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways than at 
present.  
 
If we are to make progress towards as good a world as possible 
we need to learn how to do it, and that in turn means that we 
possess institutions of learning rationally organized and devoted to 
helping us do it.  It is this that we so disastrously lack at present, 
and so urgently need. 
 
Outline of Argument in Support of Wisdom-Inquiry 
Elsewhere, I have expounded the arguments in support of 
wisdom-inquiry in some detail.
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   Here, I will be as brief as I can. 
 
There are two arguments, the first appealing to a “problem-
solving” conception of rationality, the second to an “aim-
pursuing” conception.  The second argument builds on the first.  
They establish, I claim, that knowledge-inquiry is damagingly 
irrational in a wholesale, structural way.  Wisdom-inquiry emerges 
when knowledge-inquiry is modified just sufficiently to cure it of 
its gross irrationality. 
 
I assume that a proper, basic aim of academic inquiry is to help 
promote human welfare, help people realize what is of value to 
them in life, by intellectual, technological and educational means, 
it being recognized that knowledge and understanding can be of 
value in their own right. 
 
Knowledge-inquiry holds that, first, knowledge must be 
acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social 
problems.  In order to be of value to humanity, academia must 
acquire authentic, objective, reliable knowledge.  This in turn 
means that the pursuit of knowledge must be shielded from the 
influence of all sorts of social factors, only considerations relevant 
for the determination of knowledge of truth being permitted to 
enter the intellectual domain, such as claims to knowledge, 
evidence, experiment, facts, logic, valid argument.  If this is not 
done, knowledge will degenerate into mere propaganda and 
ideology, and academia will cease to be of value to humanity.  
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Almost paradoxically, values, policies, political programmes, 
articulations of human problems and what to do about them must 
all be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry so that it 
may be of genuine benefit to humanity, and help solve human 
problems. 
 
At the core of knowledge-inquiry there is a philosophy of 
science that may be called standard empiricism.  This asserts that, 
in science, evidence alone ultimately decides what theories are 
accepted and rejected.  Simplicity, unity or explanatory power may 
influence choice of theory too, but not in such a way that the 
universe, or the phenomena, are assumed to be simple, unified or 
comprehensible.  No thesis about the world can be accepted as a 
part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence, let alone in 
violation of evidence. 
 
In deciding to what extent this whole conception of inquiry is 
rational, the notion of rationality that we require appeals to the 
idea that there is some no doubt rather ill-defined set of methods, 
rules or strategies such that, if put into practice, give us our best 
chances of solving our problems, realizing our aims.  These rules 
of reason do not guarantee success, and do not prescribe precisely 
what we must do.  They are meta-methods in that they presuppose 
that we can already implement a great variety of methods in order 
to act successfully in the world.  The meta-methods of reason help 
us marshal what we can already do so as to solve new problems, 
realize hitherto unrealized aims. 
 
Granted this relevant conception of rationality, four absolutely 
elementary rules of rational problem-solving are: (1) articulate, 
and try to improve the articulation of, the problem to be solved; (2) 
propose and critically assess possible solutions; (3) when the 
problem to be solved is intractable, break it down into a number of 
simpler, preliminary, specialized problems in an attempt to work 
gradually towards the solution to the basic problem to be solved; 
(4) ensure that specialized and basic problem-solving interact, so 
that each may influence the other. 
 
No problem-solving or aim-pursuing enterprise can be rational 
which persistently violates one or other of these four rules.  
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Knowledge-inquiry is so severely irrational that it violates, in a 
structural way, three of these four most elementary rules of reason.  
It puts rule (3) into practice to splendid effect: hence the 
multiplicity of specialized disciplines of academia today.  But 
rules (1), (2) and (4) are all violated. 
 
Granted that the aim really is to help promote human welfare, 
then the problems academia fundamentally must help to solve are 
problems of living, not problems of knowledge.  Even where new 
knowledge and technology are required, in medicine for example, 
it is always what this enables us to do (or refrain from doing) that 
enables us to achieve what is of value in life (except when 
knowledge is itself of value).  Thus, putting the first two rules into 
academic practice would involve (1) articulating, and improving 
the articulation of our problems of living, and (2) proposing and 
critically assessing possible solutions – possible and actual 
actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life.  
Knowledge-inquiry excludes these fundamental activities from the 
intellectual domain of inquiry – or at least pushes them to the 
periphery, rather than putting them at the heart of the academic 
enterprise.  Having suppressed, or marginalized, thinking about 
problems of living, knowledge-inquiry is not able to link up such 
thinking with specialized research – thus violating rule (4) as well. 
 
This gross, structural irrationality of knowledge-inquiry is 
bound to have adverse humanitarian or social consequences.  It 
means academia fails to do what it most needs to do, if it is to help 
humanity achieve what is of value, make progress towards a good 
world, namely: create, sustain and promote imaginative and 
critical thinking about what our problems of living are, and what 
we need to do about them – especially our global problems.  It 
means specialized research fails to be influenced by, and fails to 
influence, our most enlightened thinking about what our problems 
of living are, and what we need to do about them.  The aims and 
priorities of scientific research fail to respond to the most urgent 
needs of humanity.  As I have already indicated, it is the successful 
pursuit of knowledge irrationally dissociated from a more 
fundamental concern with tackling problems of living, with 
promoting wisdom, which is responsible for the genesis of our 
12  
current global problems, and our current incapacity to resolve 
them. 
Wisdom-inquiry emerges when knowledge-inquiry is modified 
structurally just sufficiently to ensure that all four rules of rational 
problem solving are put into practice.  Social inquiry and the 
humanities acquire, as their basic tasks, (1) to articulate, and 
improve the articulation of, problems of living, and (2) to propose 
and critically assess possible solutions – and to promote these 
activities in the great world beyond academe.  Social inquiry, so 
construed, is intellectually more fundamental than natural science.   
 
So much for the first argument.  I come now to the second one, 
which exploits an “aim-pursuing” notion of rationality. 
 
It may be asked: If academia really is damagingly irrational in 
the way I have argued it is, how on earth did this situation arise?  
When did it arise? 
 
It all goes back to the 18
th
 century Enlightenment, especially 
the French Enlightenment.  The philosophes – Voltaire, Diderot, 
Condorcet and company – had the profound idea that it may be 
possible to learn from scientific progress towards greater 
knowledge how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened 
world.  They thought the way to do this is to develop the social 
sciences alongside natural science.  This idea was developed 
throughout the 19th century, by Mill, Marx and others, and built 
into academia in the early 20
th
 century with the creation of 
disciplines and departments of social science.  The outcome is 
what, by and large, we have today: knowledge-inquiry.  But this 
way of developing the Enlightenment programme contains a series 
of blunders. 
 
In order to develop the profound Enlightenment idea correctly, 
the following three steps need to be got right: 
 
      (i)  The progress-achieving methods of science need to be 
correctly identified. 
(ii)  These methods need to be correctly generalized so that 
they become fruitfully applicable to any human endeavour, 
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whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the endeavour 
of improving knowledge. 
(iii) The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods 
then need to be exploited correctly in the great human endeavour 
of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, wise, 
civilized world. 
 
The philosophes got all three steps wrong, and it is this 
bungled version of the Enlightenment programme that we built 
into academia in the early 20
th
 century, knowledge-inquiry as we 
have it today being the outcome. 
 
To begin with, the philosophes took for granted rather crude 
inductivist versions of standard empiricism.  All versions of 
standard empiricism are, however, untenable.  Physics, quite 
properly, only accepts unified theories – theories that attribute the 
same laws to all the phenomena to which the theory applies – even 
though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified 
rival theories could always be concocted.  This means physics 
makes a big, persistent, implicit, metaphysical assumption: the 
universe is such that all grossly disunified theories are false (and 
hence can be ignored, whatever their empirical success might be).  
Rigour demands that this big, influential, highly problematic and 
implicit assumption be made explicit within science so that it can 
be critically assessed, so that alternatives can be developed and 
assessed, in an attempt to develop an improved version of the 
assumption.  Put another way, the basic, highly problematic aim of 
physics of discovering the precise nature of the underlying 
dynamic unity that runs through all physical phenomena needs to 
be made explicit within physics so that it can be critically explored 
and assessed in the hope that it can be improved. 
 
The best way to do this is to represent the assumption – or aim 
– of physics in the form of a hierarchy, assumptions and associated 
methods becoming less and less substantial as one goes up the 
hierarchy, and so more and more likely to be true, and more nearly 
such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of 
knowledge, to be possible at all.  In this way we create a 
framework of relatively secure assumptions and methods – aims 
and methods – high up in the hierarchy, within which much more 
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substantial and problematic assumptions and methods – aims and 
methods – can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved.  
Those modified assumptions are accepted which do the best justice 
to assumptions higher up in the hierarchy, and at the same time 
support the most empirically progressive research programmes, or 
promise to do so. 
 
We arrive at a new picture of the nature of physics, which I 
have called aim-oriented empiricism.  According to this picture, 
there is something like positive feedback between improving 
knowledge, and improving aims and methods – improving 
knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge.  Science adapts its 
nature to what it finds out about the nature of the universe.  This is 
the nub of scientific rationality, and the key to the astonishing 
progressive success of science.
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This picture of physics can be generalized to other branches of 
natural science,
11
 and so as to include broader aims of science.
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For the aims of science do not just make problematic 
metaphysical assumptions.  They make assumptions that are, if 
anything, even more problematic concerning values, and the 
humanitarian or social use of science.  The scientific pursuit of 
unified or explanatory truth is a special case of the more general 
pursuit of truth that is, in one way or another, of interest, of value, 
or of use.  And knowledge is sought so that it may be used by 
people so as to achieve what is of value in life. 
 
But precisely because these broader aims are, if anything, even 
more problematic, they too need to be subjected to sustained 
critical scrutiny in an attempt to improve them, so that they come 
to reflect the best interests of humanity. 
 
So much for the first blunder of the philosophes and what 
needs to be done to put it right.  The philosophes failed to capture 
correctly the progress-achieving methods of science – a failure still 
prevalent in the way most scientists, philosophers and others think 
about science today.
13
 
 
15  
The second blunder concerns the failure of the philosophes to 
generalize the progress-achieving methods of science correctly, 
which follows on, of course, from the first failure.  In order to put 
this right, it needs to be appreciated that it is not just in science 
that aims are problematic; this is the case in life too, for 
individuals, for institutions, for societies, for humanity.  Aims can 
be problematic because, despite what may be thought, they are 
unrealizable, undesirable, or both.  They can be undesirable 
because they conflict with other aims, or because attempts to 
realize them have all sorts of unforeseen undesirable 
consequences.  Quite generally, then, and not just in science, 
whenever aims are problematic, we need to represent them in the 
form of a hierarchy, aims becoming less and less specific and 
problematic as we go up the hierarchy.  In this way we create a 
framework of relatively unproblematic aims and associated 
methods, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more 
specific and problematic aims and methods, low down in the 
hierarchy, can be scrutinized and, we may hope, improved, as we 
act, as we live.  This generalization of aim-oriented empiricism 
may be called aim-oriented rationality. 
 
Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed 
completely to try to apply aim-oriented rationality to the immense, 
and profoundly problematic enterprise of  making social progress 
towards an enlightened, wise world.  The aim of such an enterprise 
is notoriously problematic.  For all sorts of reasons, what 
constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world, 
attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and 
permanently problematic.
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  Here, above all, it is essential to 
employ aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the 
methods of science, and designed specifically to facilitate progress 
when basic aims are problematic.  It is just this that the 
philosophes failed to do.  Instead of applying aim-oriented 
rationality to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a 
seriously defective conception of scientific method to social 
science, to the task of making progress towards, not a better world, 
but to better knowledge of social phenomena.  And this ancient 
blunder is still built into the institutional and intellectual structure 
of academia today, inherent in the current character of social 
science.
15
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Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of 
learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress 
towards an enlightened world would involve developing social 
inquiry, not as social science, but as social methodology, or social 
philosophy.  A basic task would be to get into personal and social 
life, and into other institutions besides that of science – into 
government, industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, law, 
education, international relations – hierarchical, progress-
achieving methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived 
at by generalizing the methods of science. 
 
A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would be to help 
humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living 
in more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present.  
Academia would become a kind of people’s civil service, doing 
openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do 
in secret for governments.  Academia would have just sufficient 
power (but no more) to retain its independence from government, 
industry, the press, public opinion, and other centres of power and 
influence in the social world.  It would seek to learn from, educate, 
and argue with the great social world beyond, but would not 
dictate.  Academic thought would be pursued as a specialized, 
subordinate part of what is really important and fundamental: the 
thinking that goes on, individually, socially and institutionally, in 
the social world, guiding individual, social and institutional actions 
and life.  The fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of 
inquiry would be to help humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom 
being the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of 
value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including 
knowledge and technological know-how but much else besides. 
 
But would wisdom-inquiry really help us solve our immense 
global problems?  In what follows I set out to show that it would. 
 
What Do We Need to Do? 
What do we need to do to solve our global problems?  I now 
indicate very briefly what in my view needs to be done, taking the 
main problems in turn. 
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Global Warming.  This would seem to be the most serious of 
our problems.  Let me state the obvious.  In order to come to grips 
with this problem, the industrially advanced world needs to cut 
back on its emissions of CO2 as rapidly as possible.  We must stop 
burning oil and coal, and rapidly develop alternative sources of 
power: wind, hydro-electric, wave, tidal, sunlight via photoelectric 
cells, biomass fuels and, perhaps, nuclear power.  Vehicles 
powered by petrol must be replaced by vehicles powered by 
batteries (charged by electricity in turn produced by sustainable 
means that do not emit CO2).  Energy saving devices need to be 
installed in homes, offices, factories and other buildings.  Street 
lighting needs to be made more energy efficient.  At the same 
time, global cooperation is required to put an end to the destruction 
of tropical rain forests, which significantly contributes to global 
warming. 
 
Many of these measures are highly problematic, for both 
technical and social reasons.  Wind power, hydro-electric power, 
and tidal power all tend to have adverse environmental 
consequences.  Growing biomass fuels takes land away from the 
production of crops for much needed food.  Nuclear power is, of 
course, notoriously problematic, in part because of the long-
lasting, highly radioactive material that it produces, in part because 
of the link with nuclear weapons.  Electric vehicles at present have 
nothing like the range or power of petrol or diesel fuelled vehicles.  
It is not clear what is to replace oil when it comes to ships, and 
aeroplanes  
 
It may prove possible to harvest sunlight on an industrial scale 
by means of photo-electric panels spread over square miles in 
deserts.  But photo-electric panels are expensive, and there are 
problems of transporting electricity to cities and densely populated 
areas – which tend to be far away from deserts. 
 
There are speculative ideas about how it might be possible to 
extract CO2 from the atmosphere in sufficient quantities to make a 
difference, or to cut down on the amount of sunlight reaching the 
earth, for example by sending mirrors into space between us and 
the sun.  All these ideas seem at present impractical, because of 
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expense or adverse consequences or, quite simply, because they 
would not work. 
 
The world needs to cooperate on putting a stop to the 
destruction of tropical rain forests.  Countries such as Brazil and 
Indonesia need financial and other assistance from the industrially 
advanced world.  Tropical rain forests require international 
policing to stop destructive logging. 
 
The planet will continue to grow warmer even if we stopped 
all emissions of CO2 overnight.  This is because there is a delay in 
the planetary system.  The CO2 we have already put into the 
atmosphere will continue to turn up the heat for some time to 
come.  As it is, of course, it will at best take decades for the world 
to reduce substantially its emissions of CO2.  Global warming will 
continue for decades to come.  Low lying islands and coastal 
regions will have to be abandoned, as sea levels rise, and other 
regions will have to be abandoned because of heat and drought.  
As populations rise, land available for habitation and agriculture 
will shrink, not a good prospect for peace.  World-wide 
cooperation will be needed to take care of refugees who come 
from regions made uninhabitable by global warming. 
 
War.  The world needs an international peace-keeping force 
which can be deployed swiftly anywhere on earth to intervene if 
violent conflict seems likely, or has already broken out, whether 
internal to a country, or between nations.  At present, the UN is 
supposed to perform this function, but does so ineffectually, partly 
because it cannot intervene in civil war, partly because the UN 
security council must reach agreement, and this is either not 
forthcoming at all, or only after a protracted period of wheeling 
and dealing.  Sometimes the UN supports military intervention it 
ought not to support, as in the case of the Afghanistan war
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 after 
9/11, while on other occasions it fails to support intervention it 
clearly ought to support, as in cases of conflict in Africa, in the 
former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda. 
 
In order to have an international peace-keeping force that does 
the job properly, we probably first need to establish a democratic, 
enlightened world government.  That, it might be argued, rather 
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puts the cart before the horse.  We will only be able to establish a 
democratic world government if we have already established 
world peace.  It seems reasonable to hold, however, that efforts to 
establish world peace should work in tandem with efforts to 
establish democratic world government. 
 
More than an effective, humanitarian peace-keeping force is 
required to establish world peace, as the case of Europe 
graphically illustrates.  For centuries, Europe suffered war after 
war, culminating in the horrors of the first and second world wars, 
both of which had the source in Europe.  After the second world 
war, a number politicians and others worked hard to develop trade 
and other interconnections between European states such that all 
future European wars would be unthinkable.  This hope has been 
fully realized. Yugoslavia does not really constitute an exception 
since that country was never a part of the efforts to create the 
Common Market, or the European Union.  We have here 
something like a model for what we should try to create world-
wide.  For this to succeed, though, it will probably be necessary 
for there to be democraties in all the counties of the world, and far 
greater equality of wealth than at present around the world.  (This 
proposal is very definitely not the view that the rest of the world 
should become European in character and culture; it is rather the 
view that something important is to be learned from the manner in 
which European peace has been established after centuries of war, 
for the establishment of peace throughout the rest of the world.  
We have here a particular example of what can be accomplished.) 
 
We require, too, a massive reduction in armaments and the 
military, all over the world, and especially in the USA and UK.  
All nuclear weapons need to be destroyed, and the arms industry 
needs to be massively curtailed. 
 
Population Growth.  The world’s population is predicted to 
rise to over 9 billion by 2050.  Population growth adds to global 
warming, increases likelihood of war, undermines economic 
growth, and tends to speed up destruction of natural habitats, 
extinction of species, and over fishing of the sea.  One relatively 
cheap and practical measure that could be taken to slow down 
population growth would be to ensure that every woman on the 
20  
planet of child bearing age has access to reliable birth control 
methods: the pill, the condom, the coil.  It does not help that this is 
opposed by the Catholic Church, and was opposed by the Bush 
administration in the USA.  One view is that population growth 
tends to level off as countries become wealthier.  Parents tend not 
to have so many children – the argument goes – because the need 
to provide them with an education makes children more expensive, 
parents do not need to have children to care for them in old age 
because they can rely on state care, and falling death rates among 
children mean that it is no longer seen as essential to have lots of 
children to ensure that some survive.  It is foolish to rely on these 
mechanisms, however, to slow down population growth.  What is 
required is an effective programme world wide to ensure that 
every woman of child bearing age has access to reliable 
contraception.  
 
World Poverty.  The debt of the poor countries of the world 
needs to be cancelled.  There needs to be a change in world trading 
agreements, to ensure that it is the poor countries that are 
favoured, and not the rich.  It must be permitted for poor countries 
to implement protectionism, to protect fledging industries against 
international competition.   
 
A new global Marshall Plan needs to be created, funded by the 
wealthy countries of the world – the USA, Canada, Europe, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps others – to help poor 
countries develop in as sustainable a way as possible, the emphasis 
being on education and the development of appropriate industry 
and agriculture.  This needs to be allied to efforts to promote 
democracy, and to put a stop to political corruption.  More 
scientific and technological research needs to be devoted to the 
problems of the poor: problems of health, agriculture, 
communications, education, appropriate industrial development. 
 
Destruction of Natural Habitats and Extinction of Species.  As 
an integral part of the global Marshall plan, indicated above, 
wealthy countries need to collaborate with poor and developing 
countries to take those measures required to stop the destruction of 
tropical rain forests and other natural habitats.  This involves both 
deploying and adequately financing and equipping environmental 
21  
police to put a stop to logging and hunting.  It also involves 
providing aid for alternative, more sustainable methods of 
development.  Agriculture needs to be developed in such a way 
that habitats remain for wild life to flourish.  There needs to be 
enhanced protection for endangered species. 
 
I put these global policy proposals forward, not because I think 
they make a startlingly original contribution to thought about how 
we are to solve our global problems, but rather to indicate the kind 
of things we need to do to solve these problems.  We need this as 
background to help answer the crucial question of the next section: 
“How would wisdom-inquiry help us put global policies such as 
these successfully into practice?” 
 
I am well aware that some governments, many NGOs, the UN, 
social businesses, countless individual and officials are already 
working hard to implement many aspects of these policies.  
Despite all these efforts, progress towards implementing the 
policies I have indicated (or better versions of these policies) 
remains agonizingly slow.  Some of our global problems are 
intensifying – most notably global warming. 
 
Some may complain that not enough detail has been given to 
assess these policy proposals.  I have, however, I think, said 
enough for the purposes of the argument of the next section.  
Others may complain that some, or even all, of what I have 
proposed is wrong-headed, and such that, if put into practice, 
would have dire consequences, the very opposite of what is 
intended.  Those who believe in the universal efficacy of the free 
market to solve our problems are likely, in particular, to object to 
much of the above.  My reply is that even if the above policies are 
misguided, in part or in total, this will not substantially affect the 
argument of the next section.  It must be remembered that a basic 
task of wisdom-inquiry is (a) to articulate global problems, and (b) 
propose and critically assess possible solutions.  Nothing is 
presupposed about what our problems are, and what we need to do 
about them: wisdom-inquiry is intended to help enlighten us about 
these matters.  Furthermore, even if we do need different policies 
from the above to solve our problems, nevertheless the argument 
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of the next section goes through – as long as it is agreed that we 
need to tackle our problems democratically.   
 
 
How Could Wisdom-Inquiry Help? 
How exactly, it may be asked, could wisdom-inquiry help 
humanity implement these policies – if that is what is required – 
and thus help solve our global problems in a way which is so much 
more effective than knowledge-inquiry?  Let us suppose that the 
academic revolution has occurred.  Universities everywhere put 
wisdom-inquiry into practice.  How could this make such a 
substantial difference to our capacity to solve global problems 
humanely and effectively, thus making progress towards as good a 
world as possible? 
 
In essence, the answer is extremely simple.  Our only hope of 
solving our global problems successfully lies with tackling these 
problems democratically.  Benevolent, enlightened dictatorships or 
autocracies will not meet with success.  But if democratic tackling 
of global problems is to succeed, we first need democracy to be 
established around the world, and second we need electorates – the 
world’s population – to have an enlightened understanding of what 
our global problems are, and what we need to do about them.  If 
this is lacking, democratic governments will not be able to 
implement the policies that are required.  If, on the other hand, a 
majority of the world’s people do have a good understanding of 
what our problems are, and what needs to be done about them, 
there is a good chance governments will respond to what this 
majority demands.  This assumes, of course, that it is in the 
interests of the majority that global problems be solved.  If this is 
not the case, then many might see clearly what needs to be done, 
but might nevertheless oppose the doing of it.  I shall discuss this 
possibility in the next but one section. 
 
A crucial requirement for tackling global problems 
successfully, then, is that a majority of the world’s people have a 
good understanding of what these problems are, and what needs to 
be done about them.  This is quite drastically lacking at present.  
Indeed, it may seem quite absurdly utopian to think it would ever 
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be possible for most people on earth to agree about what our 
problems are, and what we need to do about them. 
 
Step forward wisdom-inquiry.  It is just here that wisdom-
inquiry makes a dramatic difference.  A basic task of wisdom-
inquiry is (a) to articulate problems of living, including global 
problems, and (b) to propose and critically assess possible 
solutions – actual and possible actions, policies, political 
programmes, economic strategies, philosophies of life.
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A university that puts wisdom-inquiry into practice would hold 
a big Seminar once a month (let us say) devoted to discussing what 
our global problems are, and how they are to be solved.  Everyone 
at the university would be invited to attend and participate, from 
undergraduate to professor and vice-chancellor.  The Seminar 
might sometimes be big affairs, involving the media, with well-
known speakers, while on other occasions it might be smaller, 
more private, an affair for a group of specialists, devoted to some 
specific issue.  The aim would be, not just to highlight existing 
problems, or criticize existing policies, but to come up with 
workable, realistic, effective new policies.  The constitution of the 
university would be such that good ideas developed in the Seminar 
would be capable of influencing more specialized research in the 
university, and would be critically assessed by such research.  One 
result of the Seminar would be that all those associated with, and 
educated in, universities, from professor to undergraduate, would 
acquire a good understanding of what our global problems are, 
what is and is not being done about them, what could be done, and 
what kind of research and education is required to help solve them.  
A long-term task of social inquiry would be to help build aim-
oriented rationality into our diverse institutions – government, 
industry, finance, agriculture, international trade, the military, the 
media, the law, education – so that problematic aims may be 
transformed to become those that help solve global problems.  A 
fundamental task for universities implementing wisdom-inquiry is 
to educate the public about what our global problems are, and what 
we need to do about them.  This would be done, not by instruction, 
but by lively discussion and debate, ideas, arguments and 
information flowing in both directions.  There would be powerful 
inducements for academics to engage in public education by 
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means of public discussion and lectures, articles in newspapers, 
popular books, broadcasts, blogs on the internet, even novels and 
plays.  All academics want to make a contribution to academic 
thought, not only for its own sake, but also because this leads to 
academic status and prestige, academic prizes, and career 
advancement.  Granted wisdom-inquiry, contributions are judged 
in terms of their capacity to help people realize what is of value in 
life. 
 
Working within the framework of wisdom-inquiry, academics 
would, in other words, be highly motivated to engage in the kind 
of public education I have indicated (since this is integral to what 
counts as an academic contribution).  A central purpose of 
academia would be to promote cooperatively rational tackling of 
problems of living in the social world, and put aim-oriented 
rationality into practice in personal and social life.  The 
problematic aims and priorities of scientific and technological 
research would be subjected to sustained, imaginative exploration 
and criticism, by academics and non-academics alike, this feeding 
into, and making use of, the discussion of problems of living going 
on within and without academia.  Wisdom-inquiry is designed to 
engage in rational discussion of political policies and programmes, 
and to promote this as well.  Universities would have just 
sufficient power to retain their independence from pressures of 
government, public opinion, industry, and the media, but no more.  
It would be standard for a nation’s universities to include a shadow 
government.  If the actual government does not permit such a 
thing, universities would clamour to be free to create it and, in 
doing so, and would receive international support.  The nation’s 
university shadow government would be entirely without power, 
but would also be free of all the constraints and pressures that 
actual power is subject to, which tend to distort and corrupt what 
actual governments do.  The shadow university government would 
seek to develop and publish ideal possible actions, policies and 
legislative programmes which the nation’s actual government 
ought to be developing and enacting.  The idea would be that 
learning would go on in both directions, the ideal university 
shadow government learning about the realities of power, the 
nation’s actual government learning to distinguish what is merely 
politically expedient from what is in the interests of the nation and 
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humanity, a fund of good ideas for policies and legislation being 
readily available from the shadow government.  Finally, the 
world’s universities would contain a shadow university world 
government which would do, for the world, what national shadow 
governments do for nations.  A basic task would be to work out 
how an actual world government might be created, what form this 
should take, what its desirable and undesirable consequences 
would be likely to be. 
 
In brief, the whole character, structure, activity, aims and 
ideals of wisdom-inquiry universities would be such as to be 
devoted to helping humanity learn how to resolve global problems 
in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, thus making 
increasingly assured progress towards as good a world as possible.  
Universities would be humanity’s means to learn how to create a 
genuinely civilized world. 
 
The contrast with knowledge-inquiry is devastating.  
Knowledge-inquiry fails to do almost everything that needs to be 
done to help humanity make progress in tackling global problems.  
Knowledge-inquiry does, it is true, acquire knowledge and 
technological know-how, and make this available, primarily to 
government agencies and industry, to be used to solve practical 
problems.  This can undeniably be of great value and, as we have 
seen, has made possible the creation of the modern world.  But 
almost everything else that needs to be done is rigorously excluded 
from the intellectual domain of academia under the misguided idea 
that this is necessary to preserve the objectivity and reliability, the 
authentically factual character, of the knowledge that is acquired.  
Far from giving priority to (a) articulating global problems, and (b) 
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, these vital 
intellectual activities are excluded from knowledge-inquiry 
altogether, on the grounds that they involve politics, values, action, 
human suffering, morality, and can only undermine, and not 
contribute to, the pursuit of factual knowledge.  Again, far from 
giving priority to the task of introducing aim-oriented rationality 
into the social world, knowledge-inquiry does not even put aim-
oriented rationality into practice itself, in science, social inquiry or 
the humanities.  There is no place for the Seminar devoted to 
tackling global problems.  Social science and the humanities seek 
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to improve knowledge and understanding of social and cultural 
phenomena, but do not actively try to transform social life.  
Individual academics may take it upon themselves to contribute to 
public education but this is, as it were, an extra-curriculum 
activity, not a part of the official business of professional academic 
life – which is to contribute to the growth of knowledge.  Far from 
academia encouraging discussion and debate with the public, ideas 
being encouraged to flow in both directions, knowledge-inquiry, 
quite to the contrary, demands that the intellectual domain of 
inquiry be sealed off from the corrupting influence of the social 
world, so that only those considerations relevant to the acquisition 
of knowledge of truth may influence what is accepted and rejected: 
such as evidence and valid argument.  Knowledge-inquiry 
provides every inducement to academics to seek to contribute to 
knowledge, but no inducement whatsoever to engage in the extra-
curriculum activity of public education (since this does not 
contribute to knowledge).  What matters is how well-established 
and significant a contribution to knowledge is, not whether it does, 
or does not, help enhance the quality of human life.  The 
intellectual standards of knowledge-inquiry are almost exclusively 
concerned with the problem of distinguishing authentic 
contributions to knowledge from would-be contributions that fail 
to pass master, in one way or another.  These standards are not 
concerned to help improve the aims and priorities of research.  
Choosing what research aims receive financial support, and what 
do not, is left to research funding bodies to decide: it is not thrown 
open to sustained scientific and public discussion and debate.  
Inevitably, as a result, research priorities come to reflect the 
interests of those who do science, and those who pay for it – 
government and industry – rather than the interests of those whose 
needs are the greatest, the poor of the earth who, being poor, do 
not have the means to pay for scientific research.  Vast sums are 
spent on military research, very little in comparison on research 
related to the diseases and problems of the poor of Africa, south 
America and Asia.  Finally, there can be no place for a shadow 
government in the university, granted knowledge-inquiry.  Politics 
is to be excluded altogether from the intellectual domain of 
inquiry; only the pursuit of knowledge about political life is 
permitted. 
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The outcome of this wholesale failure to do what most needs to 
be done, apart from acquire knowledge, is just what might be 
expected.  Much knowledge is acquired but this, in the absence of 
a more fundamental concern to help humanity solve global 
problems, does as much harm as good.  Knowledge-inquiry, 
instead of helping to solve global problems, helps to create and 
intensify them, as we have seen. 
 
I have concentrated on universities.  But if the revolution were 
to occur in universities, it would have an impact throughout the 
whole educational and research world, as well as influencing 
dramatically, as I have tried to indicate, the media, government, 
the arts, the law, industry, agriculture, international relations, and 
personal and social life quite generally. 
 
Changing knowledge-inquiry into wisdom-inquiry in 
universities throughout the civilized world would make a dramatic 
difference to the capacity of humanity to tackle global problems 
successfully. 
 
Objections 
Objection 1: Academics would never agree to put wisdom-
inquiry into practice.  
  
Reply: The arguments for the greater rationality, intellectual 
integrity and potential human value of wisdom-inquiry are 
overwhelming.  Once these arguments have been understood by a 
sufficient number of influential academics, funding bodies and 
university administrators, universities will begin to move 
piecemeal towards wisdom-inquiry.  Indeed, as I shall show in the 
next section, this academic transformation is, to some extent, 
already underway. 
 
Objection 2: Governments, industry, public opinion would 
never permit the required academic revolution to take place. 
 
Reply: Undoubtedly in some parts of the world today it would 
indeed be impossible.  There would be difficulties in North Korea, 
Burma, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even China and 
Russia.  Even in the 30 full democracies of the world,
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attempts to instigate wisdom-inquiry would meet with opposition.  
Even democratically elected governments are unlikely to take 
kindly to academic criticism of their policies, and to the creation of 
academic shadow governments.  Those universities that took a 
lead in implementing wisdom-inquiry might find they were being 
penalized by having government funding decreased.  Industry 
might withdraw funds as well.  Academia would have an 
incredibly powerful argument in its hands to combat such 
manoeuvres: the changes are needed in the interests of rationality, 
intellectual integrity, and the future of humanity.  The public could 
be alerted to the scandal of government attempting to suppress 
academic thought devoted to helping humanity make progress 
towards as good a world as possible. This objection does not look 
very plausible when one takes into account that the academic 
revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already underway to 
some extent, in the UK and elsewhere, as we shall see in the next 
section. 
 
Objection 3: Even if the academic revolution occurred, it 
would have little impact, either because academics failed to agree 
among themselves, or because they are ignored by centres of 
power and influence. 
 
Reply: A nightmare possibility is that wisdom-inquiry 
academics simply reproduce all the standard ideas, prejudices and 
disagreements of the social world around them.  In the US, 
academics supporting the Democrats might slug it out with those 
supporting the Republicans, and no one learns anything.  I 
acknowledge that this is a possibility, but it would betray the 
fundamental intellectual ideals of wisdom-inquiry.  Those engaged 
in social inquiry need to treat policy ideas in a way that is 
analogous, in important respects, to the way natural scientists treat 
scientific theories: some such ideas may be hopeless, others may 
be partly good, partly bad, none is likely to be entirely good and 
sound, the all-important point is to pick out the best idea from its 
rivals, and subject it and its rivals to sustained critical examination, 
taking experience into account where possible, and if a better idea 
emerges from the pool of rivals, that should be adopted instead.  It 
is of course just this that aim-oriented rationality is designed to 
facilitate, in the field of ideas for solutions to problems of living, 
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on analogy with what aim-oriented empiricism facilitates within 
natural science.  It will, for many reasons, be more difficult to 
protect wisdom-inquiry social thought from subversion than it is to 
protect natural science from subversion.  Policy ideas implicate 
our lives, passions, ideals and values directly, and are much harder 
to assess rationally and by means of experience, than are scientific 
ideas.  Experiments in the social world cannot be conducted freely 
in the way in which scientific experiments can. 
 
As for academia being ignored even if it comes up with 
excellent, agreed ideas this, to some extent, is almost bound to 
occur.  But only to some extent, and for a time.  It took scientists 
decades to get governments, industry, the media and the public to 
take global warming seriously.  The long-standing failure to get 
the message across has finally led scientists to make changes to the 
nature of science – nudging things towards wisdom-inquiry, as we 
shall see in the next section.  But finally, at the time of writing 
(2009), the message has been delivered although there are few 
signs, as yet, that much is being done to reduce CO2 emissions, in 
response to this message.  In my view, the global warming 
message would have been communicated two or three decades 
earlier if wisdom-inquiry had been in place by 1945, let us say.  
The academic revolution we are considering would undoubtedly 
have a major impact, in the ways I have indicated, even if this 
impact would not be felt overnight, but would take a decade or so 
to filter through the intricacies of the social world.  
 
Objection 4: Even if the academic revolution occurred, even if 
it came up with excellent policies and technologies, and even if 
these were appreciated and understood by governments and public 
alike, still this would not make much difference because the 
barrier to solving global problems is not lack of knowledge and 
understand, but the unwillingness of the wealthy to make the 
necessary sacrifices.  Too many wealthy, powerful people do not 
want to do what needs to be done. 
 
Reply: The policies I have indicated above would undoubtedly 
meet with resistance, were they ever to be seriously on the political 
agenda.  In the USA, for example, business corporations are very 
good at protecting what they see as their interests by lobbying, by 
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funding sympathetic politicians and political parties, and by 
manipulating the media.  Even here, however, wisdom-inquiry 
could be effective, in that the public needs to become more 
enlightened about what these strategies are, and what needs to be 
done to combat them.  This assumes that it is primarily the 
business and financial world which would want to oppose the 
policies we require.  It could be argued that a majority of people 
living in wealthy countries do not want to support measures 
required to deal with global warming, or world poverty, because of 
the sacrifices that would have to be made.  This, I believe, 
overestimates the sacrifices that are required, and underestimates 
concern people have for the future of the world.  If policies are 
widely understood to be necessary, and likely to be effective, in 
tackling global warming, for example, or world poverty, then a 
majority of people in wealthy countries would be willing, I 
believe, to endorse these policies, even if some sacrifice is 
required.  Why should a global Marshall plan today meet with so 
much more resistance than the original Marshall plan encountered 
when first instigated after the second world war, when the USA 
was not as wealthy as it is today?   
 
Is the Academic Revolution Underway? 
So far I have drawn a stark contrast between knowledge-
inquiry and wisdom-inquiry, and have suggested that knowledge-
inquiry is at present dominant in universities all over the world.  
But is this really the case? 
 
I have no doubt that it was the case 25 years ago.  In 1983, for 
the first edition of my book From Knowledge to Wisdom I 
investigated six relevant aspects of academia to see which 
conception of inquiry prevailed, and found that knowledge-inquiry 
was overwhelmingly dominant.
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  However, more recently, in 
2003, I repeated the survey for the second edition of the book, and 
found that some changes had taken place in the direction of 
wisdom-inquiry, although knowledge-inquiry still dominated.
20
  
Since 2003, there have been further developments that have 
nudged some universities in the direction of wisdom-inquiry. 
 
It is possible that the academic revolution really is underway, 
and we are in the middle of a dramatic transition from knowledge-
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inquiry to wisdom-inquiry.  I now indicate some developments 
that have taken place in universities in the UK during the last 
twenty years which can, perhaps, be interpreted as constituting 
steps towards wisdom-inquiry.
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Perhaps the most significant steps towards wisdom-inquiry that 
have taken place during the last twenty years are the creation of 
departments, institutions and research centres concerned with 
social policy, with problems of environmental degradation, climate 
change, poverty, injustice and war, and with such matters as 
medical ethics and community health. For example, a number of 
departments and research centres concerned in one way or another 
with policy issues have been created at my own university of 
University College London during the last 20 years.  
 
At Cambridge University, there is a more interesting 
development. One can see the first hints of the institutional 
structure of wisdom-inquiry being superimposed upon the existing 
structure of knowledge-inquiry (as inquiry organized around the 
pursuit of knowledge may be called).  As I have indicated, 
wisdom-inquiry puts the intellectual tackling of problems of living 
at the heart of academic inquiry, this activity being conducted in 
such a way that it both influences, and is influenced by, more 
specialized research.  Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, organizes 
intellectual activity into the conventional departments of 
knowledge: physics, chemistry, biology, history and the rest, in 
turn subdivided, again and again, into ever more narrow, 
specialized research disciplines.  But this knowledge-inquiry 
structure of ever more specialized research is hopelessly 
inappropriate when it comes to tackling our major problems of 
living.  In order to tackle environmental problems, for example, in 
a rational and effective way, specialized research into a multitude 
of different fields, from geology, engineering and economics to 
climate science, biology, architecture and metallurgy, needs to be 
connected to, and coordinated with, the different aspects of 
environmental problems.  The sheer urgency of environmental 
problems has, it seems, forced Cambridge University to create the 
beginnings of wisdom-inquiry organization to deal with the issue.  
The “Cambridge Environmental Initiative” (CEI), launched in 
December 2004, distinguishes seven fields associated with 
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environmental problems: conservation, climate change, energy, 
society, water waste built environment and industry, natural 
hazards, society, and technology, and under these headings, 
coordinates some 102 research groups working on specialized 
aspects of environmental issues in some 25 different (knowledge-
inquiry) departments: see http://www.cei.group.cam.ac.uk/ . The 
CEI holds seminars, workshops and public lectures to put 
specialized research workers in diverse fields in touch with one 
another, and to inform the public. There is also a CEI newsletter.  
 
A similar coordinating, interdisciplinary initiative exists at 
Oxford University. This is the School of Geography and the 
Environment, founded in 2005 under another name.  This is made 
up of five research “clusters”, two previously established research 
centres, the Environmental Change Institute (founded in 1991) and 
the Transport Studies Institute, and three inter-departmental 
research programmes, the African Environments Programme the 
Oxford Centre for Water Research, and the Oxford branch of the 
Tyndall Centre (see below).  The School has links with other such 
research centres, for example the UK Climate Impact Programme 
and the UK Energy Research Centre.  
 
At Oxford University there is also the James Martin 21
st
 
Century School, founded in 2005 to “formulate new concepts, 
policies and technologies that will make the future a better place to 
be”.  It is made up of fifteen Institutes devoted to research that 
ranges from ageing, armed conflict, cancer therapy and carbon 
reduction to nanoscience, oceans, science innovation and society, 
the future of the mind, and the future of humanity. At Oxford there 
is also the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, 
founded in 2008 to help government and industry tackle the 
challenges of the 21
st
 century, especially those associated with 
climate change. 
 
Somewhat similar developments have taken place recently at 
my own university, University College London.  Not only are 
there 141 research institutes and centres at UCL, some only 
recently founded, many interdisciplinary in character, devoted to 
such themes as ageing, cancer, cities, culture, public policy, the 
environment, global health, governance, migration, neuroscience, 
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and security.  In addition, very recently, the attempt has been made 
to organize research at UCL around a few broad themes that 
include: global health, sustainable cities, intercultural interactions, 
and human wellbeing.  This is being done so that UCL may all the 
better contribute to solving the immense global problems that 
confront humanity.
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All these developments, surely echoed in many universities all 
over the world, can be regarded as first steps towards 
implementing wisdom-inquiry. 
 
Equally impressive is the John Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research, founded by 28 scientists from 10 different 
universities or institutions in 2000. It is based in six British 
universities, has links with six others, and is funded by three 
research councils, NERC, EPSRC and ESRC (environment, 
engineering and social economic research). It “brings together 
scientists, economists, engineers and social scientists, who 
together are working to develop sustainable responses to climate 
change through trans-disciplinary research and dialogue on both a 
national and international level – not just within the research 
community, but also with business leaders, policy advisors, the 
media and the public in general” (http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/general 
/about.shtml).  All this is strikingly in accordance with basic 
features of wisdom-inquiry.
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  We have here, perhaps, the real 
beginnings of wisdom-inquiry being put into academic practice. 
 
A similar organization, modelled on the Tyndall Centre, is the 
UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), launched in 2004, and 
also funded by the three research councils, NERC, EPSRC and 
ESRC. Its mission is to be a “centre of research, and source of 
authoritative information and leadership, on sustainable energy 
systems” (http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/). It coordinates research in 
some twelve British universities or research institutions. UKERC 
has created the National Energy Research Network (NERN), 
which seeks to link up the entire energy community, including 
people from academia, government, NGOs and business. 
 
Another possible indication of a modest step towards wisdom-
inquiry is the growth of peace studies and conflict resolution 
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research. In Britain, the Peace Studies Department at Bradford 
University has “quadrupled in size” since 1984 (Professor Paul 
Rogers, personal communication), and is now the largest 
university department in this field in the world. INCORE, an 
International Conflict Research project, was established in 1993 at 
the University of Ulster, in Northern Ireland, in conjunction with 
the United Nations University. It develops conflict resolution 
strategies, and aims to influence policymakers and others involved 
in conflict resolution. Like the newly created environmental 
institutions just considered, it is highly interdisciplinary in 
character, in that it coordinates work done in history, policy 
studies, politics, international affairs, sociology, geography, 
architecture, communications, and social work as well as in peace 
and conflict studies. The Oxford Research Group, established in 
1982, is an independent think tank which “seeks to develop 
effective methods whereby people can bring about positive change 
on issues of national and international security by non-violent 
means” (www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/). It has links with a 
number of universities in Britain. Peace studies have also grown 
during the period we are considering at Sussex University, Kings 
College London, Leeds University, Coventry University and 
London Metropolitan University. Centres in the field in Britain 
created since 1984 include: the Centre for Peace and 
Reconciliation Studies at Warwick University founded in 1999, 
the Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace, established in 2004 
at Liverpool Hope University; the Praxis Centre at Leeds 
Metropolitan University, launched in 2004; the Crime and Conflict 
Centre at Middlesex University; and the International Boundaries 
Research Unit, founded in 1989 at Durham University.
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Additional indications of a general movement towards aspects 
of wisdom-inquiry are the following.  Demos, a British 
independent think tank has, in recent years, convened conferences 
on the need for more public participation in discussion about aims 
and priorities of scientific research, and greater openness of 
science to the public.
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  This has been taken up by The Royal 
Society which, in 2004, published a report on potential benefits 
and hazards of nanotechnology produced by a group consisting of 
both scientists and non-scientists. The Royal Society has also 
created a “Science in Society Programme” in 2000, with the aims 
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of promoting “dialogue with society”, of involving “society 
positively in influencing and sharing responsibility for policy on 
scientific matters”, and of embracing “a culture of openness in 
decision-making” which takes into account “the values and 
attitudes of the public”.  A similar initiative is the “science in 
society” research programme funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council which has, in the Autumn of 2007, come up 
with six booklets reporting on various aspects of the relationship 
between science and society.  Many scientists now appreciate that 
non-scientists ought to contribute to discussion concerning science 
policy.  There is a growing awareness among scientists and others 
of the role that values play in science policy, and the importance of 
subjecting medical and other scientific research to ethical 
assessment.  That universities are becoming increasingly 
concerned about these issues is indicated by the creation, in recent 
years, of many departments of “science, technology and society”, 
in the UK, the USA and elsewhere, the intention being that these 
departments will concern themselves with interactions between 
science and society. 
 
Even though academia is not organized in such a way as to 
give intellectual priority to helping humanity tackle its current 
global problems, academics do nevertheless publish books that 
tackle these issues, for experts and non-experts alike.  For 
example, in recent years many books have been published on 
global warming and what to do about it: see: 
http://www.kings.cam.ac.uk/assets/d/da/Global_Warming_bibliogr
aphy.pdf  
 
Here are a few further scattered hints that the revolution, from 
knowledge to wisdom, may be underway – as yet unrecognized 
and unorganized.  In recent years, research in psychology into the 
nature of wisdom has flourished, in the USA, Canada, Germany 
and elsewhere.
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  Emerging out of this, and associated in part with 
Robert Sternberg, there is, in the USA, a “teaching for wisdom” 
initiative, the idea being that, whatever else is taught – science, 
history or mathematics – the teaching should be conducted in such 
a way that wisdom is also acquired.
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  There is the Arete Initiative 
at Chicago University which has “launched a $2 million research 
programme on the nature and benefits of wisdom”: see 
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http://wisdomresearch.org/. There are two initiatives that I have 
been involved with personally.  The first is a new international 
group of over 200 scholars and educationalists called Friends of 
Wisdom, “an association of people sympathetic to the idea that 
academic inquiry should help humanity acquire more wisdom by 
rational means”: see www.knowledgetowisdom.org.  The second 
is a special issue of the journal London Review of Education; of 
which I was guest editor, devoted to the theme “wisdom in the 
university”.  This duly appeared in June 2007 (vol. 5, no.2).  It 
contains seven articles on various aspects of the basic theme.  
Rather strikingly, another academic journal brought out a special 
issue on a similar theme in the same month.  The April-June 2007 
issue of Social Epistemology is devoted to the theme “wisdom in 
management” (vol. 21, no. 2).  On the 5th December 2007, History 
and Policy was launched, a new initiative that seeks to bring 
together historians, politicians and the media, and “works for 
better public policy through an understanding of history”: see 
www.historyandpolicy.org/. 
 
Out of curiosity, on 18 May 2009, I consulted Google to see 
whether it gives any indications of the revolution that may be 
underway.  Here are the number of web pages that came up for 
various relevant topics: “Environmental Studies” 9,910,000; 
“Development Studies” 7,210,000; “Peace Studies” 529,000; 
“Policy Studies” 2,160,000; “Science, Technology and Society” 
297,000; “Wisdom Studies” 5,510; “From Knowledge to Wisdom” 
18,100; “Wisdom-Inquiry” 625.  These figures do not, perhaps, in 
themselves tell us very much.  There is probably a great deal of 
repetition – and Google gives us no idea of the intellectual quality 
of the departments or studies that are being referred to.   One of 
the items that comes up in Google is Copthorne Macdonald’s 
“Wisdom Page” – a compilation of “various on-line texts 
concerning wisdom, references to books about wisdom, 
information about organizations that promote wisdom”, and 
including a bibliography of more than 800 works on wisdom 
prepared by Richard Trowbridge. 
 
None of these developments quite amounts to advocating or 
implementing wisdom-inquiry (apart from the two I am associated 
with).  One has to remember that “wisdom studies” is not the same 
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thing as “wisdom-inquiry”.  The new environmental research 
organizations, and the new emphasis on policy studies of various 
kinds, do not in themselves add up to wisdom-inquiry.  In order to 
put wisdom-inquiry fully into academic practice, it would be 
essential for social inquiry and the humanities to give far greater 
emphasis to the task of helping humanity learn how to tackle its 
immense global problems in more cooperatively rational ways 
than at present.  The imaginative and critical exploration of 
problems of living would need to proceed at the heart of academia, 
in such a way that it influences science policy, and is in turn 
influenced by the results of scientific and technological research.  
Academia would need to give much more emphasis to the task of 
public education by means of discussion and debate.  As I have 
stressed, our only hope of tackling global problems of climate 
change, poverty, war and terrorism humanely and effectively is to 
tackle them democratically.  But democratic governments are not 
likely to be all that much more enlightened than their electorates.  
This in turn means that electorates of democracies must have a 
good understanding of what our global problems are, and what 
needs to be done about them.  Without that there is little hope of 
humanity making progress towards a better world.  A vital task for 
universities is to help educate the public about what we need to do 
to avoid – at the least – the worst of future possible disasters.  
Wisdom-inquiry would undertake such a task of public education 
to an extent that is far beyond anything attempted or imagined by 
academics today.  There is still a long way to go before we have 
what we so urgently need, a kind of academic inquiry rationally 
devoted to helping humanity learn how to create a better world. 
 
Nevertheless, the developments I have indicated can be 
regarded as signs that there is a growing awareness of the need for 
our universities to change so as to help individuals learn how to 
realize what is genuinely of value in life – and help humanity learn 
how to tackle its immense global problems in wiser, more 
cooperatively rational ways than we seem to be doing at present.  
My own calls for this intellectual and institutional revolution may 
have been in vain.  But what I have been calling for, all these 
years, is perhaps, at last, beginning to happen.  If so, it is 
happening with agonizing slowness, in a dreadfully muddled and 
piecemeal way.  It urgently needs academics and non-academics to 
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wake up to what is going on – or what needs to go on – to help 
give direction, coherence and a rationale to this nascent revolution 
from knowledge to wisdom. 
 
Conclusion 
The basic point is extremely simple.  If we are to make better 
progress towards as good a world as possible, we need to learn 
how to do it.  That in turn requires that we have in our hands 
institutions of learning rationally devoted to that task.  It is just this 
that we do not have at present – although there are hints that such 
institutions might be struggling to be born.  What we have at 
present is academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge 
which, as we have seen, helps create as many problems as it 
solves.  We urgently need to transform our universities so that they 
come to put wisdom-inquiry into practice.  Only then will the God-
of-Cosmic-Value, as it is represented on earth, flourish, embedded 
as it is within the God-of-Cosmic-Power. 
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Notes 
1. This chapter is a modified version of chapter nine of Maxwell 
(2010), available online with many of my articles at: 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html. 
 
2. For a more detailed exposition of this argument see Maxwell 
(2010), ch. 1. 
 
3. This argument has been developed in a series of works: see 
Maxwell (1974; 1998; 2004, ch. 1 and appendix; 2005; 2006; 
2010, ch. 5; 2011a).  The most detailed and best expositions of the 
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argument are to be found in Maxwell (2007a, ch. 14) and Maxwell 
(2013). 
4. See Maxwell (1966; 1968a; 1968b; 1984 or 2007a, ch. 10; 1999; 
2000a; 2009a; 2011b; 2012a), and especially Maxwell (2001 and 
2010). 
 
5. See www.unicef.org/media/media_45485.html. 
 
6. Weart (2003). 
 
7. Science plus communism would have done the trick just as well 
– even better, in fact, as the record of the Soviet Union reveals (in 
connection with environmental degradation, for example). 
 
8. Or, put it using the terminology with which we began, the fault 
lies with our long-standing failure to take, as our fundamental 
problem, to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish in the God-
of-Cosmic-Power.  This is our fundamental problem of living, and 
also our fundamental intellectual problem.  If this were 
understood, it would be obvious that wisdom-inquiry is what we 
require to help us improve our attempts at solving this fundamental 
problem.  It is our failure to appreciate that this is our fundamental 
problem which has made it possible to dissociate science from 
religion, from concern with what is of value in existence, and in 
turn made it possible to develop social inquiry as social science 
(the pursuit of knowledge of social phenomena), and not as the 
endeavour to help humanity realize what is of value in life.  
 
9. For a detailed presentation of this argument see Maxwell (1984, 
or 2007a); see also Maxwell (2004).  For summaries of the 
argument see Maxwell (1980; 1992; 2000; 2007b; 2008; 2010, chs. 
5 and 6.  For accounts of the development of the argument see 
Maxwell (2009a; 2012a). 
 
10. One of the assumptions in the hierarchy of aim-oriented 
empiricism is the thesis that the universe is physically 
comprehensible – the thesis, that is, that the God-of-Cosmic-Power 
exists.  For works expounding and defending aim-oriented 
empiricism see note 3. 
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11. See Maxwell (2004, pp. 39-51). 
 
12. See Maxwell (2004, pp. 51-67). 
 
13. See especially Maxwell (1984 or 2007a, ch. 5; 2004, ch. 2). 
 
14. There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently 
problematic character of the aim of creating civilization.  People 
have very different ideas as to what does constitute civilization.  
Most views about what constitutes Utopia, an ideally civilized 
society, have been unrealizable and profoundly undesirable.  
People's interests, values and ideals clash.  Even values that, one 
may hold, ought to be a part of civilization may clash.  Thus 
freedom and equality, even though inter-related, may nevertheless 
clash.  It would be an odd notion of individual freedom which held 
that freedom was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality 
is pursued too singlemindedly this will undermine individual 
freedom, and will even undermine equality, in that a privileged 
class will be required to enforce equality on the rest, as in the old 
Soviet Union.  A basic aim of legislation for civilization, we may 
well hold, ought to be increase freedom by restricting it: this 
brings out the inherently problematic, paradoxical character of the 
aim of achieving civilization.  One thinker who has stressed the 
inherently problematic, contradictory character of the idea of 
civilization is Isaiah Berlin; see, for example, Berlin (1980, pp. 74-
79).  Berlin thought the problem could not be solved; I, on the 
contrary, hold that the hierarchical methodology indicated here 
provides us with the means to learn how to improve our solution to 
it in real life. 
 
15. See Maxwell (1984, or 2007a, chs. 3, 6 and 7).  See also 
Maxwell (2000b). 
 
16. 9/11 was a monstrous crime, not an act of war, and could not 
conceivably justify war in retaliation.  The UN issued a resolution 
which in effect supported the USA in its subsequent invasion of 
Afghanistan.  It did so, in my view, because the aggrieved nation 
was the USA.  If, instead, France had been the victim, the Louvre 
being destroyed in an analogous terrorist attack with, we may 
suppose, a similar loss of life (around 3,000 people), I feel sure the 
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UN would not have supported France in a retaliatory invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
17. Even if the policies I have outlined are the best available, they 
need to be developed in far greater detail before they qualify even 
for serious consideration.  The chances are, of course, that what I 
have proposed deserves to be rejected, because it is unworkable, 
undesirable, or both. 
 
18. The Economist has recently assessed the democratic character 
of the countries of the world: see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index.  There are 51 
dictatorships, with North Korea at the bottom of the list. 
 
19. See my (1984), ch. 6. 
 
20. See my (2007a), ch. 6. 
 
21. What follows is adapted from my (2009b). 
 
22. For more information about attempts at University College 
London to put wisdom-inquiry into practice see my (2012b).  
From the website of University College London, a policy 
document can be downloaded entitled “The Wisdom Agenda”: see 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/research/wisdom-agenda.  Here, my work 
has had some impact. 
 
23. See Tyndall Centre (2006). 
 
24. For an account of the birth and growth of peace studies in 
universities see Rogers (2006). 
 
25. See Wilsdon and Willis (2004). 
 
26. See, for example, Sternberg (1990). 
 
27. See Sternberg et al., (2007). 
 
 
